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Abstract
Simple games are a powerful tool to analyze decision-making and coalition formation in social and
political life. In this paper, we present relation-algebraic models of simple games and develop re-
lational speciﬁcations for solving some basic problems of them. In particular, we test certain fun-
damental properties of simple games and compute speciﬁc players and coalitions. We also apply
relation algebra to determine power indices. This leads to relation-algebraic speciﬁcations, which can
be evaluated with the help of the BDD-based tool RelView after a simple translation into the tool’s
programming language. In order to demonstrate the visualization facilities of RelView we consider
an example of the Catalonian Parliament after the 2003 election.
Keywords: Relation algebra, RelView, simple game, winning coalition, swinger, dominant player,
central player, power index
1. Introduction
A simple game is a cooperative game in which only two types of coalitions can be formed, win-
ning coalitions and losing ones. A winning coalition takes it all while a losing coalition receives
nothing. Since winning seems to be the essence of politics, simple games are extremely suitable
for analyzing political situations. Important concepts in the theory of simple games are swingers,
veto-players, dictators and dummies. A swinger of a winning coalition is a member of the coalition
whose removal makes it losing. A veto-player is a player who is in every minimal (wrt. set inclusion)
winning coalition. Under the monotonicity assumption no coalition can win without a veto-player. If
one player forms the only minimal winning coalition, then it is a dictator. Consequently, a dictator is
always a veto-player. There is obviously an essential diﬀerence between a veto-player and a dictator.
A dictator can enforce any decision without help of the other players. In contrast, a veto-player is
needed to win, but cannot win on his own. A dummy is a player who is a member of no minimal
winning coalition, i.e., powerless. An important class of simple games are weighted majority games,
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 DOI : 10.1016/j.ejor.2010.09.006where a weight is assigned to each player indicating its voting strength in that game. A coalition is
winning if and only if the sum of the weights of its members is not smaller than a certain quota. Con-
sider a voting body consisting of three parties A, B and C, each having 4, 2 and 1 seats, respectively.
The quota is 4 seats. Winning coalitions are the ones containing party A - the only swinger of each
winning coalition. Since {A} is the only minimal winning coalition, A is a dictator, and B and C are
dummies. Suppose now that party A has 3 seats. The total number of seats is 6 and the quota remains
4. There are two minimal winning coalitions {A, B} and {A,C}, and hence A is a veto-player, but it
is not a dictator anymore. There are no dummies. Each member of a minimal winning coalition is a
swinger, and A is the only swinger of {A, B,C}.
When studying coalition formation, one of the most important issues is to identify some key
players. Besides dictators and veto players several other such speciﬁc players exist in the literature.
In Peleg (1981, [33]) a theory of coalition formation in simple games with dominant players has been
developed. Roughly speaking, a dominant player is a player who holds a strict majority within a
winning coalition. A dominant player wants to be a member of a winning coalition, in which he is
dominating. For that reason he is called ‘oﬃce seeking’, not or hardly interested in policy. Such
players neither must exist nor must be unique. Another key player is the central player introduced in
Einy (1985, [18]). A central player can form a winning coalition both with the players to the ‘left’ of
it and with the players to the ‘right’ of it. Such a player will be ‘policy oriented’. There exists at most
one central playerin a simple game. In order to ﬁndit, the players must be ordered on arelevant policy
dimension, and the particular position of the central player makes him very powerful. An empirical
analysisoftheimportanceandeﬀectofdominantandcentralpartiesoncabinetsinWesternmultiparty
democracies has been examined e.g., in van Roozendaal (1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1997, [37, 38, 39, 40]).
In van Roozendaal (1997, [40]) the author argues that there are certain theoretical reasons by which
governments including dominant parties should be more stable than governments without dominant
parties and shows, by analyzing government survival in 12 countries between 1945 and 1989, that
such an eﬀect indeed exists in real politics.
One of the most important elements of simple games, that can be applied to all kinds of organiza-
tions (e.g., political bodies, international economic organizations and business settings), is to measure
the power of players. To this end, power indices have been proposed, e.g., the Shapley-Shubik index
(Shapley and Shubik 1954, [43]), the Banzhaf index (Banzhaf 1965, [2]), the Deegan-Packel index
(Deegan and Packel 1978, [14]), the Johnston index (Johnston 1978, [25]) and the Holler-Packel in-
dex (Holler 1982, [22]; Holler and Packel 1983, [23]). They are based on diﬀerent models for power
and, therefore, their use and informative value depend on the context in which they are applied. Ax-
iomatic characterizations, as, e.g., presented in Dubey (1975, [16]), Dubey and Shapley (1979, [17]),
Lehrer (1988, [28]), Laruelle and Valenciano (2001, [27]), Lorenzo-Freire et al. (2007, [30]) and
Alonso-Meijide et al. (2008, [1]), are helpful for the appraisal of their applicability.
Evensimpleproblemsonsimplegames(likethecomputationofalldummyplayers)areinpractice
frequently too complicated to be solved by hand. Therefore, it is useful to have supporting computer
programs available. One usually does not immediately think of programs based on relation-algebraic
formulations of the concepts in question. But experience with related problems, viz. the formation of
alliances and coalitions in Berghammer et al. (2007, 2009, [8, 9]) and the computation of the strength
of agents in social networks in Berghammer et al. (2010, [10]), led to the idea to apply relation al-
gebra and a tool for its mechanization also to computational problems on simple games. In the just
cited papers we combine relational algebra and RelView, a computer system for the visualization





































1al. (2007, [8]) the relation-algebraic approach is applied to a model of stable governments, where a
stable government is by deﬁnition not dominated by any other government. We formulate the notions
of feasibility, dominance, and stability in relation-algebraic terms, which enables us to use RelView
to compute the set of all feasible stable governments. To illustrate the power of the approach, we
analyze the real structure of the Polish government after the 2001 elections. It may happen that all
governments are dominated. In Berghammer et al. (2009, [9]) we deal with this case by combin-
ing notions from relational algebra, graph theory and social choice theory to choose a government
that is as close as possible to being un-dominated. The procedure can be executed using RelView
which allows to deal with graph sizes that are suﬃcient for practical applications. In Berghammer
et al. (2010, [10]) we use relation algebra and RelView to measure power, success, and inﬂuence of
an agent in a social network and to determine followers of a coalition and the kernel of an inﬂuence
function. As an example the Dutch parliament is considered. Among the advantages of RelView are,
for instance, short and concise programs which frequently consist of only a few lines expressing the
relation-algebraic speciﬁcation of the notions in question. The above idea was fortiﬁed by the fact
that since a long time relation algebra and RelView are successfully combined for solving problems
on many discrete structures; see e.g., Berghammer et al. (1996, [5]), Berghammer et al. (2003, [11]),
Berghammer and Milanese (2006, [7]), Berghammer and Fronk (2006, [4]), Berghammer (2009, [3]).
One of the aims of this paper is to apply relation algebra to the key concepts of simple games.
Taking into account that all these concepts are important both from a theoretical and a practical point
of view, the application of relation algebra, on the one hand being a mathematical formal approach
and on the other hand giving an immediate access to the RelView implementation, is very useful.
Because RelView has a very eﬃcient BDD (Binary Decision Diagram) implementation of relations
(see Leoniuk (2001, [29]), Berghammer et al. (2002, [6]) and Milanese (2003, [31])), it is able to
deal with non-trivial simple games that appear, e.g., in practical political life. In addition, the tool has
visualization facilities which are not easily found in other software tools and which are most helpful
for fully comprehending diﬃcult concepts and for understanding and testing the programs. In this
paper we apply relation algebra to specify relations which immediately lead to power indices. Hence,
our approach is particularly useful, because it allows to apply RelView to compute power indices.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the game-theoretic concepts
that we deal with in the paper are presented. Section 3 introduces relation algebra and the relation-
algebraic constructions which are used later. The core of the paper is Section 4. We start with two
relation-algebraic models of simple games, show how they can be transformed into each other and
present relation-algebraic speciﬁcations of basic properties of simple games. Thereby, the visualiza-
tion facilities of RelView are demonstrated in the case of the parliament of Catalonia after the 2003
election. Next, we give the relation-algebraic speciﬁcations for the sets of minimal winning coalitions
and vulnerable winning coalitions, respectively, and the sets of dummies, vetoers, dictators and null
players. Again, these notions are illustrated in the case of the Catalonian parliament using RelView.
Thirdly, we specify relation-algebraically the central player and the notions around the dominant
player. Here, the RelView tool enables us to illustrate the decisive relations underlying dominance
for the Catalonian parliament. At the end of the section we specify the Banzhaf, the Holler-Packel
and the Deegan-Packel power indices in terms of relation algebra and again demonstrate the ability of
RelView to compute these indices by means of our running example. Some concluding remarks are
presented in Section 5. In particular, we recapitulate the beneﬁts of our approach, describe important
insightswehaveobtainedfromitconcerningtheeﬃcientalgorithmic solutionofsomegame-theoretic






































In this section we present the basic concepts of the theory of simple games that we refer to in
the paper. More extensive treatments of simple games can be found, e.g., in Shapley (1962, [42]),
Felsenthal and Machover (1998, [19]) and Peleg and Sudh¨ olter (2003, [34]).
2.1. Simple Games
FollowingPelegandSudh¨ olter(2003, [34]), asimplegameisapair(N,W), where N = {1,2,...,n}
denotes the set of players and W is a subset of the powerset 2N. Any element of 2N is called a coali-
tion. A coalition S with S ∈ W is called winning, while those with S < W are called losing. A
simple game (N,W) is called monotone if W is an up-set in the order (2N,⊆), i.e., for all S,T ∈ 2N
from S ∈ W and S ⊆ T it follows T ∈ W. A voting game is a monotone simple game (N,W)
with W , ∅ and ∅ < W. The latter two axioms exclude trivial games. A simple game is proper if
the complement of a winning coalition is always losing, and strong if the complement of any losing
coalition is winning. A simple game is decisive if it is both proper and strong. In the context of
voting games, for instance, being proper is interesting since it is equivalent to the fact that any pair
of winning coalitions has a player in common and being strong is interesting since here no blocking
coalitions can occur, i.e., coalitions S such that S and its complement S are losing.
An important class of games are weighted majority games. They are omnipresent, in particular, if
groups (commissions, boards, ...) have to come to decisions and the members have unequal power.
Usually, a weighted majority game with n players is represented by a n + 1-tuple [q;w1,w2,...,wn],
where q ∈ N denotes the quota needed for a coalition to win, and wk ∈ N is the weight assigned to
player k ∈ N. By w(S) =
P
k∈S wk we deﬁne the weight of a coalition S. A coalition S is then winning
if its weight is at least as large as q, that is, S ∈ W if and only if w(S) ≥ q.
2.2. Minimal Winning Coalitions and Related Notions
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, [32]) introduced the concept of a minimal winning coali-
tion of a simple game (N,W), that is a coalition S ∈ W such that T < W for all coalitions T ⊂ S.
Less restrictive is the notion of a vulnerable winning coalition S. Here, besides S ∈ W, it is de-
manded that there exists a player k ∈ S such that T < W for all T ⊆ S \{k}. In the case of a monotone
game the latter property is equivalent to the existence of k ∈ S such that S \ {k} < W. Such a player
k ∈ S is called a swinger (or critical player) of S. These concepts are, e.g., of importance when
measuring the power of players.
Apart from swingers, one can distinguish other speciﬁc players in a simple game, depending on
their relation to minimal winning coalitions. Let (N,W) be a simple game and k ∈ N. Then k is
called a dummy if it does not belong to a minimal winning coalition, a vetoer if it is a member of each
minimal winning coalition and a dictator if {k} is the only minimal winning coalition. Finally, k is a
null player if for each coalition S ∈ 2N it holds S ∪ {k} ∈ W if and only if S ∈ W.
2.3. Central and Dominant Players
As already mentioned in the introduction, the concept of a central player has been introduced in
Einy (1985, [18]). Here it is assumed that the players of the game under consideration are ordered
with respect to their policy positions. In political science one usually uses a left-to-right spectrum and






































1Given a simple game (N,W) and a policy order of the players in the form of a linear strict order
< on N1, player k ∈ N is said to be central if the connected coalition {j ∈ N : j < k} to the ‘left’ of k
as well as the connected coalition {j ∈ N : k < j} to the ‘right’ of k are not winning, but both can be
turned into winning coalitions when k joins them.
Based on two desirability-relationships between coalitions, in Peleg (1981, [33]) the concept of
dominance and dominant players is developed. Let (N,W) be a simple game, S,T ∈ 2N be coalitions
and k ∈ N be a player. Then S is called at least as desirable as T, written as S ≥D T, if for all U ∈ 2N
from U ∩ S = ∅, U ∩ T = ∅ and U ∪ T ∈ W it follows U ∪ S ∈ W. S is said to be more desirable
than T, written as S >D T, if S ≥D T but not T ≥D S. Finally, k dominates S, written as k ≫ S, if
k ∈ S and {k} >D S \ {k}, and k is dominant if there exists a S ∈ W such that k ≫ S. If k dominates
S, then k can form a winning coalition with players outside of S while S \ {k} is not able to do this.
The dominant players are the most powerful players of the game. Such players neither must exist nor
must be unique. However, Peleg proved that in weak simple games and weighted majority games at
most one dominant player may occur. Games with dominant players are called dominated.
2.4. Power Indices
In this section we recapitulate power indices that we deal with in the paper. One of the main power
indices that can be found in the literature is the Banzhaf index (Banzhaf, 1965, [2]). Let a monotone
simple game (N,W) and a player k ∈ N be given. Then the absolute Banzhaf index Ba(k) of k and
the normalized Banzhaf index B(k) of k are deﬁned as follows, where n is the number of players:
Ba(k) :=






Another well-known power index that we study in the paper is the Holler-Packel index of Holler
(1982, [22]) and Holler and Packel (1983, [23]). Since a minimal winning coalition S coincides with
the set of its swingers, the absolute Holler-Packel index Ha(k) of k can be speciﬁed in a way very
similar to the deﬁnition of Ba(k) in (1). Compared with the deﬁnition of Ba(k), only in the numerator
the set W is to be replaced by the set Wmin of minimal winning coalitions and the denominator is to
be changed to |Wmin|. The deﬁnition of the normalized Holler-Packel index exactly corresponds to
the deﬁnition of B via Ba in (1). Hence, we have:
Ha(k) :=







A power index that is related to minimal winning coalitions is also the Deegan-Packel index of
Deegan and Packel (1978, [14]). Given a monotone simple game (N,W) with set Wmin of minimal













min denotes the set of all minimal winning coalitions of the game which contain k.






































All the concepts recapitulated in the last section will be speciﬁed again in Section 4, but then in
terms of relation algebra. Before it will be done, we present the necessary relation-algebraic notions.
For more details on relations and relation algebra, see, e.g., Schmidt and Str¨ ohlein (1993, [41]) or
Brink et al. (1997, [13]).
3.1. Relation Algebra
If X and Y are sets, then a subset R of the Cartesian product X×Y is called a (binary) relation with
domain X and range Y. We denote the set (in this context also called type) of all relations with domain
X and range Y by [X ↔Y] and write R : X ↔Y instead of R ∈ [X ↔Y]. If X and Y are ﬁnite sets of
size m and n, respectively, then we may consider a relation R : X ↔Y as a Boolean matrix with m
rows and n columns. The Boolean matrix interpretation of relations is well suited for many purposes
and also used as one of the graphical representations of relations within the RelView tool. Therefore,
in this paper we often use Boolean matrix terminology and notation. In particular, we speak of rows,
columns and entries of relations and write Rx,y instead of  x,y  ∈ R or xRy to express that x and y are
related via R.
In the present paper we use the following basic operations of relation algebra: RT (transposition),
R (complement), R ∪ S (union), R ∩ S (intersection) and RS (composition). As special relations we
use O (empty relation), L (universal relation) and I (identity relation). If R is included in S we write
R ⊆ S and equality of R and S is denoted as R = S. We assume the reader to be familiar with the
component-wise descriptions of these notions, e.g., that, given R : X ↔Y, x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, it holds
RT
x,y if and only if Ry,x and R x,y if and only if ¬Ry,x.
3.2. Modelling of Sets
Relation algebra oﬀers some simple and elegant ways to model subsets of a given set or, equiv-
alently, predicates on this set. In this paper we will use vectors, is-element relations and injective
mappings for this task.
A vector v is a relation v with v = vL. For a vector the range is irrelevant. Therefore, we consider
in the following mostly vectors v : X ↔1 with a speciﬁc singleton set 1 := {⊥} as range and omit in
such cases the second subscript, i.e., write vx instead of vx,⊥. Analogously to linear algebra we will
use lower-case letters to denote vectors. A vector v : X ↔1 can be considered as a Boolean matrix
with exactly one column, i.e., as a Boolean column vector, and represents (or: is a representation of)
the subset {x ∈ X | vx} of X. A non-empty vector v is a point if vvT ⊆ I, i.e., it is injective. This means
that it represents a singleton subset of its domain or an element from it if we identify a set {x} with the
element x. In the matrix model, hence, a point v : X ↔1 is a Boolean column vector in which exactly
one entry is 1.
Given y ∈ Y, with R(y) we denote the y-column of the relation R : X ↔Y. That is, R(y) has type
[X ↔1] and for all x ∈ X, R
(y)
x and Rx,y are equivalent. To compare the columns of two relations R and
S with the same domain X and possible diﬀerent ranges Y and Y′, we use the symmetric quotient
syq(R,S) := RT S ∩ R
T
S (4)
of them. The type of syq(R,S) is [Y ↔Y′], and transforming (4) into a component-wise notation we
have for all y ∈ Y and y′ ∈ Y′ that syq(R,S)y,y′ if and only if R(y) = S (y′), i.e., if and only if for all





































1As a second way to deal with sets we will apply the relation-level equivalents of the set-theoretic
symbol ∈, that is, is-element relations E : X ↔2X between X and its powerset 2X. These speciﬁc
relations aredeﬁnedbydemanding for allelements x ∈ X andsetsY ∈ 2X that Ex,Y ifandonly if x ∈ Y.
A simple Boolean matrix implementation of is-element relations requires an exponential number of
bits. However, in Leoniuk (2001, [29]) an ingenious implementation of E : X ↔2X using reduced
ordered binary decision diagrams (ROBDDs) is developed, where the number of BDD-vertices is
linear in the size of the base set X. This implementation is part of RelView.
Finally, we will use injective mappings for modeling sets. Given an injective function ı : Y → X
in the usual mathematical sense, we may consider Y as a subset of X by identifying it with its image
under ı. If Y is actually a subset of X and ı is given as a relation of type [Y ↔X] such that ıy,x if and
only if y = x for all y ∈ Y and x ∈ X, then the vector ıTL : X ↔1 represents Y as a subset of X
in the sense above. Clearly, the transition in the other direction is also possible, i.e., the generation
of a relation inj(v) : Y ↔X from the vector representation v : X ↔1 of the subset Y of X such that
for all y ∈ Y and x ∈ X we have inj(v)y,x if and only if y = x. We obtain inj(v) by removing from
I : X ↔X all rows which correspond to a 0-entry in v. The relation inj(v) is an injective mapping in the
relation-algebraic sense; see, e.g., Section 4.2 of Schmidt and Str¨ ohlein (1993, [41]). A combination
of such relations with is-element relations allows a column-wise representation of sets of subsets.
More speciﬁcally, if the vector v : 2X ↔1 represents a subset S of 2X in the sense above, i.e., S
equals the set {Y ∈ 2X | vY}, then for all x ∈ X and Y ∈ S we get the equivalence of (Einj(v)
T)x,Y and
x ∈ Y. This means that the elements of S are represented precisely by the columns of the relation
M := Einj(v)
T : X ↔S since for all Y ∈ S it holds Y = {x ∈ X | M
(Y)
x }. An illustration is given in
Example 4.1.1 by Figures 1 and 2, since the relation of Figure 1 equals Einj(v)
T with the relation E
and the vector v (in the transposed form) given in Figure 2.
3.3. Cartesian Products and Applications
Given a Cartesian product X ×Y of two sets X and Y, there are the two canonical projection func-
tions which decompose a pair2 u =  u1,u2  into its ﬁrst component u1 and its second component u2.
For a relation-algebraic approach it is useful to consider instead of these functions the corresponding
projection relations π : X×Y ↔X and ρ : X×Y ↔Y such that for all u ∈ X × Y, x ∈ X and y ∈ Y we
have πu,x if and only if u1 = x and ρu,y if and only if u2 = y. Projection relations enable us to specify
the well-known pairing operation of functional programming relation-algebraically as follows: For
relations R : Z ↔X and S : Z ↔Y we deﬁne their pairing (frequently also called fork or tupling)




Using (5), for all z ∈ Z and u ∈ X × Y a simple reﬂection shows that [R,S]z,u if and only if Rz,u1 and
S z,u2. As a consequence, in the case X = Y the exchange relation
X := [ρ,π] = ρπ
T ∩ πρ
T (6)
of type [X×X ↔X×X] exchanges the components of a pair. This means that for all u ∈ X × X and
v ∈ X × X the relationship Xu,v holds if and only if u1 = v2 and u2 = v1.
By a combination of the constructions introduced so far, a lot of the well-known operations and





































1predicates on sets can be speciﬁed as relations. In the present paper, we need the following:
M := syq([E,E],E) R := syq([I,E],E) C := syq(E, E)
J := syq([E, E],E) A := syq([I, E],E) S := ET E
(7)
The relations M and J have type [2X×2X ↔2X] and relation-algebraically specify set intersection and
set union, respectively, since for all  S,T  ∈ 2X×2X and U ∈ 2X it holds M S,T ,U if and only if
S ∩ T = U and J S,T ,U if and only if S ∪ T = U. The type of R and A is [X×2X ↔2X], and these
relations specify the removal and addition of elements, respectively. The latter means that for all
 x,T  ∈ X×2X and U ∈ 2X it holds R x,T ,U if and only if T \ {x} = U and A x,T ,U if and only if
T ∪ {x} = U. Finally, C and S have type [2X ↔2X] and for all S,T ∈ 2X it holds CS,T if and only if
T = S and SS,T if and only if S ⊆ T. Hence, C speciﬁes set complementation S  → S := X \ S and
S speciﬁes the subset order. To demonstrate how the relation-algebraic speciﬁcations of (7) formally
can be developed, we consider the most complicated case of set union. Assume  S,T  ∈ 2X×2X and
U ∈ 2X. Then we have
S ∪ T = U ⇐⇒ ∀ x ∈ X : (x ∈ S ∨ x ∈ T) ↔ x ∈ U
⇐⇒ ∀ x ∈ X : ¬(x < S ∧ x < T) ↔ x ∈ U
⇐⇒ ∀ x ∈ X : ¬(E x,S ∧ E x,T) ↔ Ex,U
⇐⇒ ∀ x ∈ X : [E, E] x, S,T  ↔ Ex,U
⇐⇒ syq([E, E],E) S,T ,U,
and the deﬁnition of the relation J in (7) shows the desired result.
We end this section with the following two functions (in the usual mathematical sense) which
establish a Boolean lattice isomorphism between the two Boolean lattices [X ↔Y] and [X×Y ↔1]. In
the following equations π : X×Y ↔X and ρ : X×Y ↔Y are the projection relations of the underlying
Cartesian product and L is a universal vector of type [Y ↔1].
vec(R) = (πR ∩ ρ)L rel(v) = π
T(ρ ∩ vL
T) (8)
The function vec deﬁnes the vector vec(R) corresponding to the relation R, and the inverse function
rel deﬁnes the relation rel(v) corresponding to the vector v. Using a component-wise notation, these
deﬁnitions say that for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y we have Rx,y if and only if vec(R) x,y  and v x,y  if and only
if rel(v)x,y.
4. Investigating Simple Games with Relation Algebra
In this section, ﬁrst we introduce two relation-algebraic models of simple games and show how
each of them can be transformed into the other one. Based on the vector model, we then demon-
strate how to specify important notions of simple games in the language of relation algebra. All
speciﬁcations can be seen as algorithms since they are either relation-algebraic expressions or inclu-
sions respectively equations between such expressions. Hence, they can be evaluated with the help of





































14.1. Relation-Algebraic Models of Simple Games
A ﬁrst possibility to model a simple game (N,W) with relation-algebraic means is to use a vector
v : 2N ↔1 that represents the set W as subset of 2N in the sense of Section 3.2. Frequently, v is
called the characteristic vector of the game; in our context we call it the vector model. Given such
a model v, from Section 3.2 we already know that then the columns M(S),S ∈ W, of the relation
M := Einj(v)
T : N ↔W precisely represent all winning coalitions. Hence, the game (N,W) can also
be modeled by the relation M. Since M speciﬁes membership of players in winning coalitions, i.e.,
Mk,S if and only if k ∈ S, for all k ∈ N and S ∈ W, we call it the membership model. The deﬁnition
of M shows how to transform the vector model into the membership model. We formulate this once
again as the ﬁrst part of the following theorem, where E is the is-element relation between players
and coalitions. In the second part of the theorem we show how to obtain the vector model back from
the membership model.
Theorem 4.1.1. Let (N,W) be a simple game. If v : 2N ↔1 is the game’s vector model, then
Einj(v)
T : N ↔W is its membership model. Conversely, if M : N ↔W is the game’s member-
ship model, then syq(E, M)L : 2N ↔1 (with L : W↔1) is its vector model.
Proof: Due to the above remark, we only have to show that if M is the membership model then
syq(E, M) is the vector model. For all S ∈ 2N we get
(syq(E, M)L)S ⇐⇒ ∃T ∈ W : syq(E, M)S,T ∧ LT
⇐⇒ ∃T ∈ W : ∀k ∈ N : Ek,S ↔ Mk,T
⇐⇒ ∃T ∈ W : ∀k ∈ N : k ∈ S ↔ k ∈ T
⇐⇒ ∃T ∈ W : S = T
⇐⇒ S ∈ W.
This property shows that the vector syq(E, M)L represents W as subset of 2N, as required for the
vector model of the game. ￿
Choosing one of the two relation-algebraic models to specify a game-theoretic notion usually depends
on the analyzed concept. Since the columns of the membership model M of (N,W) enumerate the
winning coalitions and since it can hardly be seen from the vector model v which coalitions are
winning, the relation M is more appropriate if one wants RelView to compute the winning coalitions.
However, as experience has shown, the great advantage of the vector model is that it enables in many
cases much more elegant relation-algebraic speciﬁcations than the membership model. This holds in
particular if a task requires to treat coalitions which are non-winning. For S ∈ 2N in the vector model
the property S < W is simply expressed by v S, whereas in the membership model, for instance,
it may require to consider the vector representation s : N ↔1 of S and to verify syq(M, s) = O.
Speciﬁcations that are based on the vector model are frequently even more eﬃcient than membership-
based ones. This is especially the case if a high percentage of coalitions is winning, since then in
the membership model a lot of columns occur. That almost half of the coalitions are winning is
typical in practice. E.g., using data from van Deemen (1989, [15]), van Roozendaal (1990, [36]) and
Berghammer et al. (2010, [10]), with the help of RelView we obtained for Dutch parliaments that
from the 8192 possible coalitions of the 13-parties parliament after the 1972 election 3999 (48.8%)
are winning, from the 1024 possible coalitions of the present 10-parties parliament 505 (49.3%) are





































1(50%) are winning. Apart from the visualization of input and output, in the remainder of the paper we
restrict ourselves to the vector model. In the next theorem we give ﬁrst examples for relation-algebraic
speciﬁcations of game-theoretic notions that are based on the vector model. In it, S : 2N ↔2N denotes
the subset order as introduced in (7).
Theorem 4.1.2. Assume v : 2N ↔1 to be the vector model of a simple game (N,W). Then (N,W) is
monotone if and only if Sv ⊆ v and is a voting game if and only if in addition v , O and v ⊆ ETL.
Proof: That Sv ⊆ v speciﬁes monotonicity follows from
Sv ⊆ v ⇐⇒ ∀S ∈ 2N : (Sv)S → v S
⇐⇒ ∀S ∈ 2N : (∃T ∈ 2N : SS,T ∧ v T) → v S
⇐⇒ ∀S,T ∈ 2N : S ⊆ T ∧ T < W → S < W
⇐⇒ ∀S,T ∈ 2N : S ⊆ T ∧ S ∈ W → T ∈ W.
The equivalence of v , O and W , ∅ is trivial and the remaining claim is shown by
v ⊆ ETL ⇐⇒ ∀S ∈ 2N : vS → ∃k ∈ N : ET
S,k ∧ Lk
⇐⇒ ∀S ∈ 2N : S ∈ W → ∃k ∈ N : k ∈ S
⇐⇒ ∀S ∈ 2N : S ∈ W → S , ∅. ￿
In the next theorem we specify relation-algebraically the properties of a simple game of being proper
and strong. Here C : 2N ↔2N is the relation for set complementation; cf. (7).
Theorem 4.1.3. Given v : 2N ↔1 as the vector model of a simple game (N,W), the game is proper
if and only if v ⊆ Cv and the game is strong if and only if v ⊆ Cv.
Proof: Starting with a formal logical speciﬁcation of being a proper game, the ﬁrst claim is shown by
∀S ∈ 2N : S ∈ W → S < W ⇐⇒ ∀S ∈ 2N : S ∈ W → ∃T ∈ 2N : T = S ∧ T < W
⇐⇒ ∀S ∈ 2N : vS → ∃T ∈ 2N : CS,T ∧ v T
⇐⇒ v ⊆ Cv.
In the same way the second speciﬁcation can be calculated. ￿
Since C is a mapping in the relation-algebraic sense, we get due to Schmidt and Str¨ ohlein (1993, [41])
that v ⊆ Cv if and only if Cv = Cv ⊆ v. Hence, the simple game is decisive (i.e., proper and strong)
if and only if v = Cv if and only if v = Cv.
Also for weighted majority games a vector model v : 2N ↔1 can be computed within relation
algebra. To this end, the players are interpreted as the parties of a parliament and the weights are
interpreted as the number of the parliament seats the party holds, i.e., in the very same way as in real
political life. Then the only requirement to obtain v is that, given X as set of seats, there is a mapping
(in the relation-algebraic sense) D : X ↔N at hand that describes the distribution of the seats, i.e.,
fulﬁlls for all x ∈ X and k ∈ N that Dx,k if and only if seat x is owned by party k. Since the concrete
procedure is irrelevant for the remainder of the paper, we do not go into details here and refer the






































1Figure 1: Membership model of the Catalonian game
In general, the number of winning coalitions of a simple game can grow rapidly with the number
of players. For example, if the game is proper and strong and n is the number of players, then
the number of winning coalitions is 2n−1, i.e., 50% of all coalitions are winning. Therefore, in the
following example that shall demonstrate the visualization facilities of RelView we deal with a rather
small game, taken from Lorenzo-Freire et al. (2007, [30]).
Example 4.1.1. We consider the following weighted majority game with ﬁve players, that is a repre-
sentation of the parliament of Catalonia, one of the 17 Spanish autonomous communities, after the
November 2003 election.
[68;46,42,23,15,9]
The players are, from left to right, labeled with the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5; they correspond (in the
same order) to the ﬁve Catalonian parties CIU, PSC-CPC, ERC, PP and ICV-EA. In the picture of
Figure 1 the membership model M : N ↔W of this game is shown as depicted by RelView in the
relation-window of its userinterface. In this 5×16 Boolean matrix ablack squaremeansa 1-entry and
a white square means a 0-entry. So, for example, the winning coalition represented by the ﬁrst column
of M consists of the three parties PSC-CPC, ERC and ICV-EA. If we transform the membership model
M into the vector model, we obtain a vector v : 2N ↔1 in which exactly 16 entries are 1. The two
pictures of Figure 2 show the is-element relation E : N ↔2N and, below it, the transpose of the vector
v (that is, the row vector vT : 1↔2N). The 32 columns of the is-element relation E represent the 32
coalitions. A comparison of the pictures (here the row vector representation of the game is of great
advantage) shows that the 1-entries of the vector model v precisely designate those columns of E that
belong to the membership model M.
As a weighted majority game, (N,W) is monotone. We have also tested whether it is proper and
strong using the RelView-versions
proper(E,v) = incl(v,Compl(E)*-v) strong(E,v) = incl(-v,Compl(E)*v)
of the relation-algebraic speciﬁcations of Theorem 4.1.3, where the pre-deﬁned RelView-operation
incl tests inclusion of relations and the RelView-function
Compl(E) = syq(-E,-E)





































1computes from the is-element relation E : N ↔2N the relation S : 2N ↔2N for set complementation.
In both cases we obtained the answer ‘yes’. ￿
4.2. Computing Minimal Coalitions and Related Notions
Computing minimal winning coalitions with relation-algebraic means is easy. It is well-known, cf.
Schmidt and Str¨ ohlein (1993, [41]) that, given a strict order relation R : X ↔X and a vector w : X ↔1
that represents a subset Y of X, the vector w ∩ RTw : X ↔1 represents the set of minimal elements
of Y as a subset of X. Hence, if we take w as vector model v : 2N ↔1 of a simple game (N,W) and
R as the irreﬂexive part of the subset order S : 2N ↔2N, we get immediately the following result.
Theorem 4.2.1. If v : 2N ↔1 is the vector model of the simple game (N,W), then the vector
minwin(v) := v ∩ (S ∩ I)
T
v
of type [2N ↔1] represents the set Wmin of minimal winning coalitions. ￿
Next, we specify relation-algebraically the is-swinger relation and the vector of vulnerable winning
coalitions. To simplify the calculations, we only consider monotone games. With regard to practical
applications this is no serious restriction.3 Recall from Section 3, that R is the relation-algebraic
speciﬁcation of element-removal and the function rel yields for a vector that represents a subset of a
Cartesian product in the sense of Section 3.2 the corresponding ‘proper’ relation.
Theorem 4.2.2. Let v : 2N ↔1 be the vector model of a monotone simple game (N,W). If we deﬁne
the is-swinger relation Swingers(v) : N ↔2N and the vector vulwin(v) : 2N ↔1 by
Swingers(v) := E ∩ Lv
T ∩ rel(Rv) vulwin(v) := Swingers(v)
TL
(with L : N ↔1), then for all k ∈ N and S ∈ 2N it holds Swingers(v)k,S if and only if k is a swinger of
S and vulwin(v)S if and only if S is a vulnerable winning coalition.
Proof: For all k ∈ N and S ∈ 2N we have
Swingers(v)k,S ⇐⇒ (E ∩ LvT ∩ rel(Rv))k,S
⇐⇒ Ek,S ∧ (LvT)k,S ∧ rel(Rv)k,S
⇐⇒ Ek,S ∧ (LvT)k,S ∧ (Rv) k,S 
⇐⇒ Ek,S ∧ (LvT)k,S ∧ ∃T ∈ 2N : R k,S ,T ∧ v T
⇐⇒ Ek,S ∧ vS ∧ ∃T ∈ 2N : S \ {k} = T ∧ v T
⇐⇒ Ek,S ∧ vS ∧ v S\{k}
⇐⇒ k ∈ S ∧ S ∈ W ∧ S \ {k} < W.
3In the political science literature typically one only considers monotone simple games as, e.g., in Peleg (1981, [33]),






































1Since (N,W) is monotone, the last formula speciﬁes k as a swinger of S. This is the ﬁrst result. Using
it, the second one is shown by
vulwin(v)S ⇐⇒ (Swingers(v)
TL)S
⇐⇒ ∃k ∈ N : Swingers(v)
T
S,k ∧ Lk
⇐⇒ ∃k ∈ N : k ∈ S ∧ S ∈ W ∧ S \ {k} < W
⇐⇒ S ∈ W ∧ ∃k ∈ N : k ∈ S ∧ S \ {k} < W. ￿
So far, we have considered swingers and speciﬁc coalitions. In the remainder of the section, we
turn towards speciﬁc players with more or less power such as a dummy, a vetoer, a dictator and a
null player. The next theorem shows how the sets of these speciﬁc players can be speciﬁed relation-
algebraically as vectors. It uses the relation A of (7) for the addition of an element.
Theorem 4.2.3. Based on the vector model v : 2N ↔1 of a simple game and m := minwin(v) as
vector representation of the set Wmin of minimal winning coalitions, we consider the following four
vectors of type [N ↔1] (where [N ↔N] is the type of the I in syq(I,E) and [2N ↔2N] is the type of
the I in Im):
dummy(m) := Em vetoer(m) := Em
dictator(m) := syq(I,E)(m ∩ Im) null(v) := syq(rel(Av)
T,v)
Then dummy(m) (vetoer(m), dictator(m) and null(v), respectively) represents the set of dummies (ve-
toers, dictators and null players, respectively).
Proof: We only verify the speciﬁcations for dictators and null players. Assume k ∈ N. Then the ﬁrst
case follows from
dictator(m)k ⇐⇒ (syq(I,E)(m ∩ Im))k
⇐⇒ ∃S ∈ 2N : syq(I,E)k,S ∧ mS ∧ Im S
⇐⇒ ∃S ∈ 2N : (∀ j ∈ N : Ij,k ↔ Ej,S) ∧ mS ∧ ¬∃T ∈ W : I S,T ∧ mT
⇐⇒ ∃S ∈ 2N : (∀ j ∈ N : j = k ↔ j ∈ S) ∧ mS ∧ ∀T ∈ W : mT → S = T
⇐⇒ ∃S ∈ 2N : S = {k} ∧ S ∈ Wmin ∧ ∀T ∈ Wmin : S = T
and the second case follows from
null(v)k ⇐⇒ syq(rel(Av)
T,v)k
⇐⇒ ∀S ∈ 2N : rel(Av)
T
S,k ↔ vS
⇐⇒ ∀S ∈ 2N : (Av) k,S  ↔ vS
⇐⇒ ∀S ∈ 2N : (∃T ∈ 2N : A k,S ,T ∧ vT) ↔ vS
⇐⇒ ∀S ∈ 2N : (∃T ∈ 2N : S ∪ {k} = T ∧ T ∈ W) ↔ S ∈ W
⇐⇒ ∀S ∈ 2N : S ∪ {k} ∈ W ↔ S ∈ W,






































1Figure 3: Vulnerable and minimal winning coalitions of the Catalonian game
Let us consider what the RelView-programs corresponding to the above speciﬁcations yield in the
case of our running example. Since the is-swinger relation is decisive for computing power indices,
we postpone its picture until Section 4.4 that is devoted to this topic.
Example 4.2.1. If the RelView-programs we have obtained from the relation-algebraic speciﬁca-
tions vulwin(v) and minwin(v) of Theorem 4.2.2 and Theorem 4.2.1 are applied to the vector model
of Example 4.1.1, then the tool yields two vectors which, again in transposed form to save space, are
shown in the two pictures of Figure 3. The row vector on the top designates the 13 vulnerable winning
coalitions of the parliament of Catalonia after the 2003 election, and that under it designates the ﬁve
minimal winning coalitions. From these results we could obtain the ‘concrete’ form of the coalitions
by a comparison with the columns of the is-element relation E : N ↔2N as remarked in Example
4.1.1. The much more easier way is, however, to use the technique for the column-wise enumeration
of sets presented in Section 3.2, i.e., to evaluate the two expressions Evulwin(v)
T and Eminwin(v)
T.
Doing so, we obtain the left-most and right-most of the three RelView-matrices of Figure 4, from
which each vulnerable winning coalition and each minimal winning coalition, respectively, can im-
mediately be obtained as a column. The RelView-matrix in the middle column-wisely enumerates the
sets of swingers of the vulnerable winning coalitions. It is obtained by removing from the is-swinger
relation all columns corresponding to a 0-entry in the vector representation of the vulnerable winning
coalitions. Relation-algebraically this reads as Swingers(v)inj(vulwin(v))
T.
To explain the three RelView-matrices of Figure 4 a bit more, we compare the ﬁrst columns of
the two 5×13 matrices. Since they are identical, that means, each party is a swinger, the represented
coalition {PSC-CPC,ERC,ICV-EA} is a minimal winning one. This agrees with the column-wise
enumeration of these coalitions in which the coalition appears, too. Next, we compare the third
columns of the two matrices. From the ﬁrst matrix we get {PSC-CPC,ERC,PP,ICV-EA} as vulner-
able winning coalition and from the second one {PSC-CPC,ERC} as the set of its swingers. Hence,
this coalition is not minimal winning. Again this agrees with the right-most matrix, since now the
coalition does not occur as a column.
To demonstrate RelView’s visualization potential a bit more, the RelView-graph of Figure 5
shows the Hasse-diagram of the inclusion order S of the 32 coalitions of our example. In this picture
theinclusionrelationshipsbetweenthe16winningcoalitionsarehighlightenedbyboldfacearcs; from
this it becomes immediately clear that the game is monotone. The ﬁve minimal winning coalitions are
drawn as white squares and the 11 non-minimal winning coalitions are drawn as black circles.
For our running example we also have computed the vectors speciﬁed in Theorem 4.2.3. Here all
results delivered by the RelView tool were empty. ￿





































1Figure 5: The ordered coalitions of the Catalonian game
4.3. Computing Central and Dominant Players
In this section we deliver relation-algebraic speciﬁcations of the sets of central and dominant
players. Let us start with the concept of a central player. Note that since there exists at most one
central player in a simple game, the vector given in the following theorem either is empty or is a point
in the sense of Section 3.2. Since the vector is speciﬁed as relation-algebraic expression, we use the
letter P for the policy order and not the inﬁx-symbol < as in Section 2.3.
Theorem 4.3.1. Let a simple game (N,W) with a linear strict policy order P : N ↔N be given and
assume that v : 2N ↔1 is the game’s vector model. Then the vector
central(v,P) := syq(P,E)v ∩ syq(PT,E)v ∩ syq(P ∪ I,E)v ∩ syq(P
T ∪ I,E)v
of type [N ↔1] (where I : N ↔N) represents the set of central players.
Proof: Let k ∈ N be a player. Then we have
(syq(P,E)v)k ⇐⇒ ¬∃S ∈ 2N : syq(P,E)k,S ∧ vS
⇐⇒ ∀S ∈ 2N : (∀ j ∈ N : Pj,k ↔ Ej,S) → v S
⇐⇒ ∀S ∈ 2N : (∀ j ∈ N : Pj,k ↔ j ∈ S) → v S
⇐⇒ ∀S ∈ 2N : S = {j ∈ N : Pj,k} → S < W





































1and a replacement of P by its transpose in this calculation shows
syq(PT,E)v ⇐⇒ {j ∈ N : Pk,j} < W.
Next, we deal with the third expression of the intersection and get
(syq(P ∪ I,E)v)k ⇐⇒ ∃S ∈ 2N : syq(P ∪ I,E)k,S ∧ vS
⇐⇒ ∃S ∈ 2N : (∀ j ∈ N : (Pj,k ∨ Ij,k) ↔ Ej,S) ∧ vS
⇐⇒ ∃S ∈ 2N : (∀ j ∈ N : (Pj,k ∨ j = k) ↔ j ∈ S) ∧ vS
⇐⇒ ∃S ∈ 2N : S = {j ∈ N : Pj,k} ∪ {k} ∧ S ∈ W
⇐⇒ {j ∈ N : Pj,k} ∪ {k} ∈ W.
Again by a replacement of P by PT we ﬁnd for the fourth expression
(syq(P
T ∪ I,E)v)k ⇐⇒ {j ∈ N : Pk,j} ∪ {k} ∈ W.
If we read Pj,k as j < k, the conjunction of the right-hand sides of the derived equivalences precisely
means that k is a central player. ￿
Next, let us study the concept of a dominant player. In the following, we show how two desirability
concepts introduced in Peleg (1981, [33]) can be speciﬁed relation-algebraically. We do it again in
such a way that this leads to RelView-programs after a simple translation step.
Inthedecisiveﬁrstpartofthefollowingtheoremitisshownhowtheconcept‘at-least-as-desirable’
can be speciﬁed relation-algebraically by means of a vector with a Cartesian product as domain. The –
again vector-based – speciﬁcations of ‘more-desirable’ and ‘dominance’ then are easy consequences
of the theorem’s ﬁrst part. Recall from Section 3, that J and R are the relation-algebraic speciﬁcation
of set union and element-removal, respectively, X is the relation for exchanging the components of
pairs, the function rel transforms vector representations into ‘proper’ relations and the function vec is
the inverse of rel.
Theorem 4.3.2. Let v : 2N ↔1 be the vector model of a simple game (N,W). Then the vector
alades(v) := L([ETE, ETE] ∩ [rel(Jv),rel(Jv)])
of type [2N×2N ↔1] (where L : 1↔2N) represents the at-least-as-desirable relation ≥D as subset of
2N×2N. For the more-desirable relation >D the same is obtained by the vector
mdes(v) := alades(v) ∩ Xalades(v)
of type [2N×2N ↔1]. With π : N×2N ↔N as ﬁrst projection of N×2N, ﬁnally, the vector
dom(v) := vec(E) ∩ [πsyq(I,E),R]mdes(v)





































1Proof: To prove the ﬁrst claim, let a pair  S,T  ∈ 2N×2N be given. Then we have the following
equivalence:
alades(v) S,T  ⇐⇒ L([ETE, ETE] ∩ [rel(Jv),rel(Jv)])  S,T 
⇐⇒ ¬∃U ∈ 2N : L⊥,U ∧ [ETE, ETE]U, S,T  ∧ [rel(Jv),rel(Jv)]U, S,T 
⇐⇒ ¬∃U ∈ 2N : ETE U,S ∧ ETE U,T ∧ rel(Jv)U,S ∧ rel(Jv)U,T
⇐⇒ ¬∃U ∈ 2N : ETE U,S ∧ ETE U,T ∧ (Jv) U,S  ∧ (Jv) U,T 
⇐⇒ ∀U ∈ 2N : ETE U,S ∧ ETE U,T ∧ (Jv) U,T  → ¬(Jv) U,S 
Now, we consider the four relationships of the body of the quantiﬁcation. We calculate
ETE U,S ⇐⇒ ¬∃ j ∈ N : E
T
U,j ∧ Ej,S ⇐⇒ ¬∃ j ∈ N : j ∈ U ∧ j ∈ S ⇐⇒ U ∩ S = ∅
for the ﬁrst one. In the same way we get the equivalence of the relationship ETE U,T and U ∩ T = ∅.
For the third relationship we obtain
(Jv) U,T  ⇐⇒ ∃V ∈ 2N : J U,T ,V ∧ vV
⇐⇒ ∃V ∈ 2N : U ∪ T = V ∧ V ∈ W
⇐⇒ U ∪ T ∈ W.
A similar calculation shows that (Jv) U,S  if and only if U ∪ S < W. Summing up, we have shown
the equivalence
alades(v) S,T  ⇐⇒ ∀U ∈ 2
N : U ∩ S = ∅ ∧ U ∩ T = ∅ ∧ U ∪ T ∈ W → U ∪ S ∈ W,
the right-hand side of which is the formal logical speciﬁcation of the relationship S ≥D T and, thus,
concludes the proof of the ﬁrst claim.
To verify the second claim we assume again a pair  S,T  ∈ 2N×2N to be given. Then the desired
result is shown by the following derivation, since the last line of it is the formal logical speciﬁcation
of S >D T:
mdes(v) S,T  ⇐⇒ (alades(v) ∩ Xalades(v)) S,T 
⇐⇒ alades(v) S,T  ∧ Xalades(v)  S,T 
⇐⇒ S ≥D T ∧ ¬∃ U,V  ∈ 2N×2N : X S,T , U,V  ∧ alades(v) U,V 
⇐⇒ S ≥D T ∧ ¬∃ U,V  ∈ 2N×2N : S = V ∧ T = U ∧ alades(v) U,V 
⇐⇒ S ≥D T ∧ ¬alades(v) T,S 
⇐⇒ S ≥D T ∧ ¬(T ≥D S)
Finally, the last claim is shown by the following calculation for all pairs  k,S  ∈ N×2N, which





































1Figure 6: The more-desirable relation of the Catalonian game
relationship k ≫ S:
dom(v) k,S  ⇐⇒ (vec(E) ∩ [πsyq(I,E),R]mdes(v)) k,S 
⇐⇒ vec(E) k,S  ∧ ([πsyq(I,E),R]mdes(v)) k,S 
⇐⇒ Ek,S ∧ ∃ T,U  ∈ 2N×2N : [πsyq(I,E),R] k,S , T,U  ∧ mdes(v) T,U 
⇐⇒ k ∈ S ∧ ∃ T,U  ∈ 2N×2N : (syq(I,E)k,T ∧ R k,S ,U ∧ T >D U
⇐⇒ k ∈ S ∧ ∃ T,U  ∈ 2N×2N : {k} = T ∧ S \ {k} = U ∧ T >D U
⇐⇒ k ∈ S ∧ {k} >D S \ {k} ￿
If we apply the function rel of (8) to the three vectors of Theorem 4.3.2, then we obtain again relation-
algebraic speciﬁcations rel(alades(v)), rel(mdes(v)) and rel(dom(v)) for the relations ≥D, >D and ≫,
respectively, but now as ‘proper’ relations of type [2N ↔2N] in the ﬁrst two cases and [N ↔2N] in the
latter case. The RelView-versions of rel(alades(v)) and rel(mdes(v)) allow to visualize the at-least-as-
desirable and the more-desirable relation of a simple game (N,W) with vector model v : 2N ↔1 not
only as Boolean matrices but also as directed graphs. As we have already demonstrated, in the latter





































1Figure 7: The dominance relation of the Catalonian game
portions. The speciﬁcation rel(dom(v)) at once leads to a RelView-program for determining the
game’sdominantplayers. Recallthatthedominantplayersarethosewhicharerelatedtoanelementof
W via the dominance relation ≫. Taking v as vector representation of W and rel(dom(v)) as relation-
algebraic speciﬁcation of ≫, this immediately yields rel(dom(v))v : N ↔1 as vector representation of
the set of dominant players of the game.
Example 4.3.1. For our running example now we demonstrate how RelView can be used to treat the
concepts of ‘desirability’ and ‘dominance’. In the RelView-picture of Figure 6 we show the Hasse-
diagram of the more-desirable relation rel(mdes(v)) of the parliament of Catalonia after the 2003
election. The directed graph is drawn using the level-oriented graph-drawing algorithm of Gansner
et al. (1993, [21]). The meaning of the arrow is that one coalition is more desirable than another
one. From the level at the top we get that half of the coalitions is maximal with respect to ‘more-
desirability’ and these coalitions coincide with the winning ones (since the row vector representation
of the winning coalitions of Example 4.1.1 says that precisely the columns of E with labels 14-16
or labels 20-32 represent winning coalitions). In the case of the dominance-relation rel(dom(v)) :
N ↔2N, the RelView tool delivers the 5 × 32 Boolean matrix of Figure 7. It shows that party CIU
(row number 1 in the matrix) is the only dominant player of the parliament because it dominates
the three winning coalitions with column labels 20, 21 and 25. Recall from the RelView-picture of
the vector model in Example 4.1.1 that the coalitions with column labels 17-19 and the coalitions
dominated by the other parties are not winning. ￿
4.4. Computing Power Indices
In this section we apply relation algebra to some power indices. More precisely, we present
relation-algebraic speciﬁcations that immediately lead to the Banzhaf, Holler-Packel and Deegan-
Packel indices. There is a very close relationship between the relation Swingers(v) : N ↔2N of
Theorem4.2.2andthepowerindicesintroducedin(1)and(2)thatalsoisthekeyfortheircomputation
using the RelView tool. This relationship is presented in the next theorem. To enhance readability,
for X and Y being ﬁnite, R : X ↔Y and x ∈ X, we denote the number of 1-entries of R by |R| and the
number of 1-entries of the x-row of R by |R|x. Hence, |R| equals the cardinality of R (as set of pairs)
and |R|x equals the cardinality of the subset Y′ of Y that is represented by the transpose of the x-row
in the sense of Section 3.2.
Theorem 4.4.1. Assume a monotone simple game (N,W) with n players and its vector model v :
2N ↔1. Furthermore, let a player k ∈ N be given. Then we have for the Banzhaf index that
(i) Ba(k) =
|Swingers(v)|k
2n−1 (ii) B(k) =
|Swingers(v)|k
|Swingers(v)|












































1Figure 8: The is-swinger relation of the Catalonian game
Proof: Equation (i) is trivial since the transpose of the k-row of Swingers(v) represents the set {S ∈















which is (ii). Equation (iii) is again trivial and (iv) is shown analogously to (ii). ￿
If the RelView tool depicts a relation R as Boolean matrix in the relation-window, then in the win-
dow’s status bar the number of 1-entries of R is shown. Furthermore, it is able to mark its rows and
columns for explanatory purposes. So far, we have only shown the possibility to attach consecutive
row and/or column numbers. But also the numbers of 1-entries can be attached as labels. In combina-
tion with Theorem 4.4.1 this immediately allows to compute Banzhaf and Holler-Packel indices. We
demonstrate this by means of our running example.
Example 4.4.1. If we use RelView to compute the is-swinger relation Swingers(v) for the vector
model v of our running Catalonia parliament example and additionally instruct the tool to attach
consecutive row and column numbers, and for each row also the number of its 1-entries as second
label (after the sign ‘/’), we get the picture of Figure 8. From the second row labels 10,6,6,2,2 and
the fact that there are exactly 26 1-entries, we immediately obtain the following normalized Banzhaf







If in these fractions the denominators 26 are changed to 25−1 = 16, then the results are the parties’





16. Next, we evaluate the expression
Swingers(minwin(v)). Then RelView depicts the labeled Boolean matrix of Figure 9 on its screen.







In Example 4.2.1 we have shown that there are ﬁve minimal winning coalitions. As a consequence, a












































1Figure 10: Relations for determining the Deegan-Packel indices
The Shapley-Shubik index, the Deegan-Packel index and the Johnston index are three further promi-
nent power indices for measuring power in simple games. In contrast with the Banzhaf and Holler-
Packel indices, their deﬁnitions use more arithmetic operations than (1) and (2). As we will show in
the next example by means of the Deegan-Packel index, in principle relation algebra and RelView can
also be applied here. But the example also shows the limit of the use of RelView in respect thereof.
Example 4.4.2. To compute the Deegan-Packel index D(k) of player k ∈ N using relation algebra and
the RelView tool, we assume the vector representation m := minwin(v) of the set Wmin of minimal
winning coalitions to be at hand and the player k ∈ N to be represented by a point p : N ↔1 in the
sense of Section 3.2. If E : N ↔2N is the is-element relation, then a little reﬂection shows that the
vector ETp : 2N ↔1 represents the set of all coalitions S ∈ 2N such that k ∈ S, and hence the relation




of type [N ↔W
(k)
min] column-wisely represents the set W
(k)
min used in (3) to deﬁne D(k). Based on m
and (9), now D(k) can be determined by performing one after another the following three steps:
1. Compute for each column of Deegan(m, p) the reciprocal value of the number of its 1-entries.
2. Add all numbers obtained by the ﬁrst step.
3. Divide the result of the second step by the number of 1-entries of m.
In the case of our Catalonian parliament example, the RelView tool delivered the ﬁve relations
Deegan(m, p) which are depicted in Figure 10, where the point p represents (from left to right) the
ﬁve parties CIU, PSC-CPC, ERC, PP and ICV-EA. If we apply the above procedure, then we obtain


























It is obvious that the calculations of Example 4.4.2 can hardly be done by hand if the number of
minimal winning coalitions is large. For instance, the situation becomes a good deal worse in the
case of the present 10-parties Dutch parliament, since here already 42 of the 505 winning coalitions
are minimal winning. To overcome the diﬃculties caused by the restrictive programming language of
RelView4 the Kure library has been developed; see Milanese (2003, [31]), Szymanski (2003, [44]). It
comprises the core functionality of RelView and opens the possibility to integrate relation-algebraic
computations into C- and Java-programs. Particularly with regard to the above example, a use of
Kure allows to perform all the arithmetic computations we have done by hand automatically by the
superordinate C or Java-program.
4Caused by the speciﬁc application domain of the tool, relations are the only pre-deﬁned datatype of this language and
all further datatypes have to be modeled via them. In particular, real numbers and their base operations do not exist and
it seems to be very diﬃcult to model the reals in the same elegant and eﬃcient way as, e.g., sets and a lot of structures of






































In this paper we have presented two relation-algebraic models of simple games. For the vec-
tor model, we have developed relation-algebraic speciﬁcations for testing fundamental properties of
simple games and for computing speciﬁc players and coalitions, and some relations which are im-
portant for determining dominance and power indices. All speciﬁcations are algorithmic and can be
evaluated by the BDD-based tool RelView after a straightforward translation into the tool’s program-
ming language. To demonstrate the visualization facilities of RelView, we have used the Catalonian
Parliament after the 2003 election as example.
The correctness of all relation-algebraic speciﬁcations we have presented and, hence, also of the
corresponding RelView-programs is guaranteed by the extremely formal calculations that drastically
reduce the danger of making errors. In fact, we have obtained the results by developing formally
the relation-algebraic expressions and formulas from the original predicate-logic speciﬁcations. The
formulation in the prevalent mathematical theorem-proof-style has only been chosen to emphasize
the results and to enhance readability. We regard this goal-oriented development of programs from
formal speciﬁcations that are correct by construction as the ﬁrst advantage of our approach. As the
secondadvantageofourapproachweregarditscomputer-supportbymeansofanappropriatetool. All
relation-algebraicspeciﬁcationswehavedevelopedareexpressedbyextremelyshortandconciseRel-
View-programs. Consequently, these are easy to alter in the case of slightly changed speciﬁcations,
e.g., if winning coalitions additionally have to be connected (i.e., to form intervals w.r.t. a given policy
order) as in Einy (1985, [18]) or to be feasible w.r.t. a set of policies in the sense of Berghammer et
al. (2007, [8]) or if, as in van Deemen (1989, [15]), in the deﬁnition of S ≥D T only for all non-empty
U ∈ 2N from U ∩S = ∅, U ∩T = ∅ and U ∪T ∈ W it has to follow that U ∪S ∈ W. Combining this
feature of RelView with its possibilities for visualization and stepwise execution of programs allows
the user to experiment and play with established as well as new concepts while avoiding unnecessary
expenditure of work. This makes the tool very useful for scientiﬁc research. Nowadays, systematic
experiments are accepted as a way for obtaining new insights and scientiﬁc results, and tools for this
purpose become increasingly important as one proceeds in investigations. The very eﬃcient RelView
implementation of relations via BDDs was of immense help for the problems we have treated in this
paper. Due to it, without any problems we have been able to apply our algorithms to a lot of simple
games originating from real political life. Such simple games are presented, e.g., in Peleg (1981,
[33]), van Deemen (1989, [15]), van Roozendaal (1990, [36]) and Freixas and Molinero (2009, [20]).
Many problems appearing in connection with simple games are known to be intractable in terms
of complexity theory, for instance, #P-complete5 or NP-hard. See e.g., Prasad and Kelly (1990,
[35]) for more details. There are special algorithms tailored for such hard problems, like the O(n 2
n
2)
algorithm for the Banzhaf index and the O(n2 2
n
2) algorithm for the Shapley-Shubik index of weighted
majority games presented in Klinz and Woeginger (2005, [26]), and the multilinear-extension-based
algorithms mentioned in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2008, [1]) and Lorenzo-Freire et al. (2007, [30]). In
spite of the fact that RelView implements relations very eﬃciently, frequently it cannot compete with
these special algorithms. To give an example, with the programs resulting from the present paper we
have not been able to tackle the United States Federal System game with 537 players that is described
in Freixas and Molinero (2009, [20]).






































1It is impossible to estimate the largest n for which RelView can reasonably perform calculations
for simple games, because this very much depends on the relation one wants to evaluate, on the
number of minimal winning coalitions and other things. But RelView has dealt with many examples
from real life with up till 20 players in a very eﬃcient way.
In RelView it is possible to indicate for a relation R of its workspace the number of vertices of the
BDD implementing R. By the experiments performed with the tool we have noticed that in almost all
cases the numbers of vertices of the BDDs for the vector of winning coalitions are relatively small and
the same is true for the BDDs of the results of the computations. E.g., the BDD of the vector model
of the 13-parties Dutch parliament after the 1972 election consists of 13 vertices only and 17 BDD-
vertices suﬃce to implement the is-swinger relation of this game. If problems appeared in the form
of very large BDDs, then those typically implemented intermediate results during the computations
and were then caused by modiﬁcations of BDDs for which the use of the relation-algebraic operations
proved to be unnecessarily complicated. As a consequence, we came to the insight that BDDs seem to
be an excellent means for solving game-theoretic problems eﬃciently if they are manipulable in full
generality and not only via the relation-algebraic operations (the programming language of RelView,
respectively). In the following, we brieﬂy sketch our present work in this regard.
Due to RelView’s particular implementation of relations using BDDs, relational vectors with 2n
rows as introduced in Section 3.2 correspond exactly to Boolean functions with n input variables
that are implemented by BDDs (see Leoniuk (2001, [29]) and Berghammer et al. (2002, [6]). So,
if we represent the set of winning coalitions W of a simple game with n players by a relational
vector in RelView (or the Kure library mentioned above), it internally uses a BDD with n variables
to implement the characteristic function of W. This representation of the set of winning coalitions
of a simple game using a BDD is the starting point of Bolus (2010, [12]). In this paper, besides
the representation size of (vector-)weighted majority games, also the computation of the minimal
winning coalitions and the computation of some common power indices is investigated. Due to the
relationship between relational vectors and BDDs, the results are directly transferable and usable in
the context of RelView. For instance, a BDD — and thus a vector model in our sense — of a weighted
majority game with quota q and n players can be built in expected worst-case running time O(n   q)
and the resulting BDD has size at most n(q + 1). Provided constant time arithmetic on integer and
rational numbers, Banzhaf and Holler-Packel indices of all players can be computed in expected worst
case running time O(n   q) and the Shapley-Shubik and Deegan-Packel indices of all players can be
computed in expected worst case running time O(n3   q), if the players are ordered by non-increasing
weights. In Bolus (2010, [12]) results for vector-weighted games and the general case are presented
for most of the four power indices. In the BDDs framework one can also apply, e.g., the upper bound
of O(2
n
2) to the size of the BDD of any weighted majority game; see Hosaka et al. (1994, [24]).
But, in contrast to the purely relation-algebraic approach of the present paper, the development
of game-theoretic algorithms based on BDDs requires much more eﬀort, the implementation has
to be much more elaborated, and it often requires further knowledge of more technical issues such
as complementary edges. Moreover, the correctness proofs are much more complicated and much
less formal than ours – with all negative consequences. Additionally, using relation algebra as “in-
termediate language” does not produce less eﬃcient algorithms in general. To the contrary, many
algorithms are usable in practice and are reasonably fast. If they are not adequate for the problem do-
main, the implementation of relations often allows to change perspective and to utilize BDDs directly
without friction as seen here. This way, RelView can be seen as a platform which incorporates not





































1hard problems. The current direction in the development of RelView is to make it more extensible
by expanding its interface in such a way that it is possible to outsource program logic into small
problem-speciﬁc modules, so-called plug-ins. By speciﬁc game-theoretic plug-ins that are based on
Bolus (2010, [12]), in the meantime we are able to deal also with large problems that cannot be solved
with the original RelView tool, such as the above mentioned United States Federal System game with
537 players. To give an impression of concrete running times, for this example the algorithm of Bolus
(2010, [12]) computes a BDD for the set of winning coalitions that has about 67000 vertices and, from
it, then the Banzhaf indices of all players — altogether in less than 1 second. But it is most important
that the experiments with RelView led to this new BDD-approach to game-theoretic problems. It
should additionally be remarked that the experiments frequently even gave the decisive hints how the
algorithms have to work.
In Bolus (2010, [12]) only a portion of the problems we have solved in this paper is investigated.
For the future, we plan to extend this approach also to the remaining problems, i.e., to implement cor-
responding plug-ins for RelView. First experiments in respect thereof led to the impression that test-
ing fundamental properties and determining key players directly by means of the BDD-representation
of W should not be very diﬃcult. But we fear that computing the relations decisive for dominance
from this BDD remains as diﬃcult as in the case of the relation-algebraic approach.
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